UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22786
13 July 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 13 JULY 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED RESPECTIVELY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 13 July 1991 from Mr. Ahmad Hussein, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning Iraq's compliance with Security Council resolution 687 (1991). I also transmit two letters, dated 10 and 12 July 1991, from the Minister to Mr. Hans Blix, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, concerning Iraq's accounts of nuclear materials.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex I

Identical letters dated 12 July 1991 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Iraq has accepted all the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and expressed its willingness to cooperate with the Council, the Secretary-General and his representatives in ensuring the serious and good-faith implementation of those resolutions, despite Iraq's deep feeling that they are biased and unjust.

During the past months, Iraq has actively and painstakingly fulfilled its obligations despite continued attempts to cast doubts as to its intentions ... attempts which have been accompanied by various forms of threat and distortion.

When confusion arose as to the work of the inspection teams, Iraq expressed its willingness to receive the mission appointed by the Secretary-General with Mr. Ekéus at its head. The mission was received at the highest levels in Iraq, and a serious and practical dialogue was conducted with a view to facilitating its task and overcoming whatever obstacles might arise in its work, particularly in the extremely difficult circumstances confronting Iraq with respect to communications, transport and services as a result of the military action against it from 17 January to 28 February 1991, which inflicted widespread destruction on the country's civilian infrastructure.

The high-level mission led by Mr. Ekéus was given categorical assurances in connection with all the requests it made, whether with regard to the security and safety of the inspection teams - which had not in fact been exposed to any form of danger - or to the facilitation of its task of inspection under the terms of Security Council resolutions. During the mission's stay in Baghdad, all practical measures considered appropriate by the mission were taken to facilitate its task of inspection, and these measures were indicated in its report to the Security Council.

In response to the proposal made by Mr. Blix, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), during discussions in Baghdad, the Iraqi Government submitted a long list of all the devices, equipment and locations of interest to the mission and explained the history and nature of the Iraqi peaceful nuclear programme, which was also explained in the letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. This could have been included among the results and achievements of Mr. Ekéus' mission to Baghdad if he had accepted the proposal of the Minister for Foreign Affairs that he extend his stay in Baghdad for one further day. The letter detailed the reasons which, in the opinion of the Iraqi Government, justified the non-submission of this information at an earlier date. In the course of his response, the Minister went on to resolve and explain all the queries directed to him by the Director-General of IAEA with respect to the details of his letter

incorporating the lists and the programme. You may wish to study the letters dated 10 and 12 July 1991 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Blix. In addition, our Ambassador in Vienna, the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the International Atomic Energy Agency, provided an official explanation to the Director-General concerning the comments raised at the unofficial meeting of the Board of Governors held last week, as well as of the comments made by Mr. Blix.

Nevertheless, despite the serious and active cooperation displayed by Iraq in connection with this and other issues relating to the implementation of the Security Council resolutions, the United States - before, during and after the mission's visit - has launched and continues to conduct a large-scale frenzied campaign of threats to carry out further military aggression against Iraq. American officials have begun to speak openly of their intention to attack, of the preparations under way for this purpose and of the means available for such action. American officials have used this issue as an additional excuse to maintain the economic sanctions against Iraq, to interfere in its internal affairs and to impose their wishes on the noble people of Iraq in a manner which is flagrantly incompatible with international laws and conventions and with the text of the Security Council resolutions themselves.

The United States is currently preparing for a further massive military attack on Iraq. As a pretext for such an attack, it is declaring that it intends to strike at the locations and equipment which aroused the concerns of the high-level mission. Iraq has already declared - and today reaffirms - its absolute willingness to enable the United Nations inspection teams to visit and view all such locations and equipment and to interact with them in accordance with the Security Council resolutions.

Why, then, does the United States resort to military means to strike against Iraq if its true objective is to implement the Security Council resolutions?

The correct conclusion, which becomes apparent from all the statements made by American officials, is that the United States wishes, by launching this new attack, to achieve political aims which have no connection with the Security Council resolutions and the concerns expressed therein. By doing so, it is continuing the process which it began on 17 January, when it made use of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) not to evict Iraq's armed forces from Kuwait, as specified in the resolution, but to destroy Iraq's economic capacities, infrastructure and achievements in terms of science and civilization, in order to promote its own objectives, and those of zionism, of achieving complete hegemony over the Middle East region. It is now preparing to carry out the second stage of this plan, having failed to achieve all the objectives of the first stage between 17 January and 28 February 1991 and in the course of the subsequent events, in which the United States played a major role.

Iraq is once again subject to the threat of massive military aggression by the United States, which is once again using the Security Council resolutions and the concerns expressed therein as a pretext and cover to launch this attack.

Iraq has accepted the Security Council resolutions, despite its legitimate feelings with respect to them. It has declared and confirmed its willingness to implement them and is entirely willing to cooperate with the Council and the Secretary-General in order to ensure their implementation.

The Security Council is not supposed to allow any one of its members to act in the name of the Council in order to promote its own aggressive and expansionist aims in a manner inconsistent with international laws, values and conventions.

We hope that the Security Council will put an end to this aggressive behaviour on the part of America against a noble and independent State Member of both the United Nations and the international community which has suffered as a result of aggression and whose people is continuing to suffer from the unjust and biased economic sanctions. We hope that those States members of the Council which recognize their responsibility in matters of peace and security and the rights of peoples to freedom, dignity and independence will take a stand commensurate with their legal responsibilities as members of the Security Council, and with their consciences, to forestall this new stage of the American aggression against Iraq.

(Signed) Ahmad HUSSEIN
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Iraq

Annex II

Letter dated 10 July 1991 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency

We have received, by way of Iraq's representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), your letter to us of 9 July 1991.

In response to your request for comments on the contents of your letter, we should like to provide you with the following observations and explanations:

You mentioned in your letter that Iraq had a uranium enrichment programme which it had not subjected to IAEA safeguards in accordance with the agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency (INFCIRC/172). We should like to make the point in this context that the safeguards agreement, which is based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, does not prevent any State Party to the Treaty from conducting research and development in the field of uranium enrichment without informing the Agency, provided that such research does not reach the stage which requires notification and subjection to the safeguards system. This fact is illustrated in table 3, transmitted together with my two letters of 7 July 1991: the three methods are still at the stage of research and development, and there is no isotope enrichment unit under the terms of article 98 of the safeguards agreement. We understand article 28 of the safeguards agreement as referring to meaningful (significant) quantities of nuclear materials. In this regard, we wish to refer to the definition of a meaningful (significant) quantity of nuclear material, as contained in article 89 of document IAEA/SG/INF/1, which defines the term as corresponding to 75 kilograms of uranium enriched at a rate of less than 20 per cent of uranium-235. One half kilogram is thus well below that threshold.

We should also like to refer to the findings of the Zancker Commission, which adopted criteria for the monitoring and export of sensitive technologies. The work of that Commission was of major importance in determining much of the contents of the safeguards system. The Commission stated that the smallest quantity of enriched uranium which could be subjected to monitoring was one active kilogram. In this connection, we should also like to refer you to paragraph 300 of document IAEA/SG/INF/1(Rev.1), issued in 1987.

All the above remarks confirm that the quantity under discussion is not covered by the safeguards system.

With regard to your remarks concerning the uranium enriched by a centrifuge system, we have checked the English translation, as provided by IAEA, of our letter and the tables transmitted therewith against your comments in your letter. We note a discrepancy between that translation and, on the one hand, the contents of your letter and, on the other, the Arabic text of our letter. For this reason, we consider it most important to provide an accurate technical explanation of the matter.

One model of a centrifuge was tested rather than a series of centrifuges. The object of testing the one model was to determine the centrifuge's separation performance. Accordingly, the material was rotated in the centrifuge, the enriched product was mixed with the spent product and both were used to feed the centrifuge once again. Due to the use of the rotation principle in the experiment, no enriched material was accumulated. This constitutes an accurate scientific explanation of the statement in the table to the effect that no appreciable quantities were enriched in the course of the tests, because the level of enrichment achieved was nullified by the aforementioned mixing process.

It will be clear to you from the above remarks that the centrifuge enrichment method is still at an early stage of scientific research.

You established some sort of link between the production of one half kilogram of uranium enriched at a rate of 4 per cent of uranium-235 and article 34 (c) of the agreement. We understand all three paragraphs of article 34 to deal with the subject of the import and export of nuclear materials from and to Iraq, and Iraq's consequent obligations to notify the Agency of any nuclear material. Article 34, paragraph (c), refers to the importation by Iraq of nuclear material in any form, at any level of refinement, and at any stage of the nuclear fuel cycle. However, the half kilogram of uranium under discussion, enriched at a rate of 4 per cent, was not imported by Iraq but produced locally in the course of experiments for research and development purposes. Our interpretation of article 34 is that it does not cover this case. Even if we suppose that the provisions of article 34, paragraph (c), go beyond the context of importation, we believe that our comments below on article 42, and particularly on the definitions of technical terms contained therein, justify our affirmation that article 34, paragraph (c), does not apply in the case of one half kilogram of uranium enriched at a rate of 4 per cent.

With respect to the references in your letter to article 42, the information contained in table 3 relating to the three enrichment methods does not in any way indicate the existence of a "facility", but only of technological components which are still at the development stage and whose production and engineering specifications have not yet been completely finalized: certain physical and engineering aspects are not yet fully understood and require further research and development before it is possible to adopt industrial, engineering and planning specifications for the purpose of constructing an integrated facility, with a determined capacity, operational procedure and other technical details which would make it possible to provide the Agency with final design data.

These specifications cannot be determined before actual tests are carried out using uranium. For this reason, it is our interpretation that article 42 does not apply to the current state of enrichment activities as described in table 3, transmitted together with my two letters of 7 July 1991.

As you notice, we have endeavoured in this letter to provide a precise account of the scientific and technical facts as well as to explain our position of commitment to the various articles and paragraphs of the safeguards agreement. Nevertheless, we are prepared to dispatch a specialized technical mission, if you so wish, to answer questions and offer clarifications if you should have any further queries.

(Signed) Ahmad HUSSEIN
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq

Annex III

Letter dated 12 July 1991 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Further to our letter dated 10 July 1991, and with reference to your letter of 11 July 1991, which stated that there were large quantities of nuclear materials which have not previously been reported under the terms of paragraphs 34 (c) and 34 (b) of the safeguards agreement, we wish to provide the following comment and explanation:

1. With regard to the quantities of yellow-cake and uranium dioxide: the Ministry of Defence requested the Atomic Energy Commission to carry out research and tests into the use of ceramic and metallic uranium for non-nuclear purposes, one of its concerns being to strengthen the anti-armour missile warhead.

This research has made considerable progress but has not yet been completed, particularly from the points of view of technology and fabrication. The programme requires large quantities of uranium and, because these quantities were not needed for nuclear purposes, the Agency was not informed under the terms of paragraph 34 (b) of the safeguards agreement.

We should also like to point out that the Atomic Energy Commission always, on its own initiative, offered to show stocks of nuclear materials not covered by the inspection to the Agency's inspectors during their visits for that purpose. This measure was designed to illustrate our good faith, given that those materials were in the stores together with the other nuclear materials being investigated by the inspectors: the inspectors indicated that the yellow-cake was not subject to inspection and did not at any time ask to investigate or to check whether notification was or was not required.

2. With regard to the uranium hexafluoride: the quantity of this substance (465 grams of natural uranium) is minimal. No nuclear laboratory working with such materials would do so unless it had to: this quantity, in our opinion, does not require notification or control.

3. With regard to the quantities of uranium tetrachloride: these are used to feed the test systems for electromagnetic enrichment.

As you know, the rate of the flow of the material produced in the enrichment cell to the cell's feed material is usually very low: this is true of all enrichment methods. In electromagnetic enrichment in particular, the material is not rotated automatically in the separator: the required quantity of feed material depends on a number of factors, including the rate of evaporation of the material in the oven, its ionization capacity, the proportion of positive uranium ions extracted from the source to other ions, the rate of flow to the collector from the extractor, the collection capacity

and thus the weight of uranium-235 in the collector and the rate of enrichment achieved.

One half kilogram of uranium enriched at a rate of 4 per cent requires approximately one half ton of uranium tetrachloride for its production. It will be clear from the above remarks that the quantity of 2.5 tons mentioned in the table constitutes a normal quantity for the feeding of experimental separators: we do not believe that it requires notification.

In conclusion, despite our clarifications above, we believe that our notification of these materials (as transmitted in our letter of 7 July 1991), although provided under the terms of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), in any event constitutes a corrective measure which we believe to be sufficient under the terms of paragraph 19 of the safeguards agreement.

(Signed) Ahmad HUSSEIN
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq

UNITED
NATIONS

A S

General Assembly Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/45/1035
S/22787
15 July 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fifth session
Agenda item 153
IRAQI AGGRESSION AND THE CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT IN FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-sixth year

Letter dated 12 July 1991 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, and with reference to the request from the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, contained in document A/46/141, to include in the provisional agenda of the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly an item entitled "Exploitation of the environment as a weapon in times of armed conflict and the taking of practical measures to prevent such exploitation", and the explanatory memorandum annexed to that request, I should like to state that my country welcomes the inclusion of the said item out of our substantial concern and interest in protecting the environment and natural resources, which are the property of the entire mankind, and preventing their use as a weapon of terrorism as we witnessed during the war of Kuwait's liberation.

However, we regrettably notice that in citing the environmental devastation suffered by Kuwait and the region the explanatory memorandum annexed to the request has overlooked the fact that this environmental calamity was not the result of military conflict (as the memorandum says), but was the product of a deliberate act that was planned in the very first days of the brutal Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Our delegation has already asserted that in its memorandum addressed to Your Excellency on 20 August 1990 (S/21572) when the invading Iraqi forces set out then to mine all the vital Kuwaiti institutions and installations, including the oil facilities, thereby setting the stage to destroy them when the operation of liberating Kuwait begins. That is exactly what occurred, as the vanquished Iraqi forces applied

the scorched-land policy by burning more than 700 oil wells, and they also destroyed all the oil refineries and gathering stations as well as the power and water desalinization plants, not to mention the other industrial and civil installations. All that was preceded by flooding several millions of oil barrels into the waters of the Arab Gulf, an act that constituted the most extensive pollution of the marine environment in history.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 153, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammad AL SALLAL
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22788
15 July 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the Security Council the attached communication which he has received from the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Annex

Letter dated 12 July 1991 from the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the Secretary-General

Attached herewith is a consolidated report on the first two IAEA inspections under Security Council resolution 687 (1991). You may deem it appropriate to transmit this report to the Security Council members.

(Signed) Hans BLIX

Enclosure

CONSOLIDATED REPORT ON THE FIRST TWO IAEA INSPECTIONS UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 687 (1991) OF IRAQI NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

11 July 1991

CONSOLIDATED REPORT ON THE FIRST TWO IAEA INSPECTIONS UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 687 (1991) OF IRAQI NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

1. This report summarizes the principal findings of the first two inspections under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) conducted by the IAEA of Iraqi nuclear capabilities. These inspections were carried out between 15 - 21 May 1991 and 22 June - 3 July 1991 with the assistance and co-operation of the Special Commission of the United Nations. The first inspection was carried out by a team of 34 drawn from 20 Member States and was headed by Mr. D. Perricos of the IAEA as Chief Inspector. The second inspection consisted of a team of 18 personnel from 8 Member States and was headed by Mr. M. Zifferero (22 June - 26 June) and Mr. D. Kay (26 June - 3 July), both from the IAEA.

2. These two initial inspections had three principal inspection objectives:

- first, the verification of the accuracy and completeness of the Iraqi declarations submitted under the requirements of Security Council resolution 687,
- second, to conduct inspections of sites designated by the Special Commission established under resolution 687 where there were ground to believe that undeclared nuclear activities had been conducted or that undeclared equipment might be stored, and
- third, to develop an over-all picture of the nature, direction and capabilities of the Iraqi nuclear programme.

Verification of the accuracy and completeness of the the Iraqi declarations

3. The declaration by the Government of Iraq of 27 April 1991 principally concerned facilities, material and activities at Al-Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Centre.[1] Inspection of Al-Tuwaitha found the

[1] Al-Tuwaitha Site Map in Annex I

following:

a. Facilities

i. The inspection found that many building where significant activities may have taken place were thoroughly destroyed -- in many cases by military activities during the conflict, but in some significant cases by extensive clearing operations carried out by Iraqi authorities during and after the conflict. In almost all cases documentation and records had disappeared and were not available. Smear tests and samples of intact or only partially damaged equipment and of the surrounding areas were taken and their analysis continues. However, much of the site was damaged or cleared to such an extent that this analysis process is very difficult, and in some cases is incapable of definitive results. The overall impression is of a site where most significant buildings have been thoroughly destroyed or cleared and, with only a few exceptions noted below, provide only limited concern for future verification unless substantial rebuilding takes place.[2] However, it is clear that much of the equipment which once existed at Al-Tuwaitha has been removed to other locations, most of which were not disclosed to the first two inspections.

ii. **Research reactors.** (B24 and B13)[3] Both the Tamuz 1 & 2 reactors were heavily damaged. They would be difficult to restore and, in any event, the weapons significance of the facilities is now dependent on the HEU fuel only. In the case of Tamuz 1, there had been no attempt to rebuild the reactor since the 1981 attack, and the heat exchangers and pumps were found in a separate store and had not been used elsewhere.The building housing the IRT-5000 reactor was very heavily damaged, but the pool with reactor fuel and storage racks was still intact, albeit covered with substantial amounts of debris and rubble. The fuel was still inside the core, the pool and the external storage bay. The fuel is highly enriched uranium (80% and 36%) and, therefore, requires future action to remove it as required by resolution 687. After the fuel is removed the remains of the reactor building will be unusable.

iii. **Hot cells.** The hot cells in the reactor building (B24) are mechanically badly damaged with the master-slave manipulators

[2]Annexes II and III summarize the status as of the first inspection.

[3]Numbers refer to Al-Tuwaitha Site Map in Annex I

destroyed on the outside but with the concrete structure intact. Because of the surrounding debris it was impossible during the first mission to confirm the situation inside the cell and monitoring is required until the status is determined. Hot cells with damaged manipulators, but with their basic structure sound, remain in the Radioisotope Production Laboratory (B15). Additional hot cells remain in the "LAMA" Hot Metallurgy Testing Laboratory and in the radioactive waste treatment station. Future monitoring will be required of all these cells.

iii. **Laboratory and Workshop Building (B23).** The Iraqi authorities declared this building to have been used mainly for laser and optics work. However, due to the total destruction of this building and the removal by Iraq of all accessible equipment it was not possible to verify its use.

iv. **"LAMA" Hot Metallurgy Testing Laboratory (B22).** This building had been heavily bombed and there was no independent evidence of the use that had been made of this building. There had been salvage of some of the equipment from the two hot cells.

v. **Radioactive Waste Treatment Station (B25).** This building was partially damaged, but had two hot cells in good condition and with the machinery inside the station undamaged. The cells were not equipped with manipulators and were equipped for the specialized waste treatment process consistent with the declared use of the building.

vi. **Radiochemistry Laboratories (B9).** All three compartments of the hot cells with 150 mm of lead shielding were intact. The first part was used for dissolution, the second for equipment maintenance and the third for mixer settlers. The equipment had been used for separation of fission products from spent fuel. A separate room had 10 free-standing alpha glove-boxes for actinide separation. The process was on a small scale (2.26 g of plutonium was declared as separated) but has a larger significance in establishing the capability for plutonium separation.

vii. **Radioisotope Production Laboratory (B15).** This building contained two hot cells, one with 900 mm of shielding, the other with 1200 mm barytic shielding. The building was extensively damaged with all services destroyed. There were also originally 23 lead cells which are now scattered as a result of the bombing. the applications for which this building was declared to be used would be allowed under the terms of

resolution 687, but future monitoring would be required to ensure that its use was limited to these purposes.

viii. **The "Italian" Area (B73).** This area was heavily bombed and the fuel fabrication plant and chemical engineering research were almost completely destroyed. The material testing building sustained some damage but the essential equipment survived.

ix. **Materials Testing laboratory (Ceramics and Metals) (B68).** The building was rendered unusable by the bombing, and all of its equipment had been removed. Equipment said by the Iraqis to be from this building was later shown to the first inspection team. This equipment, if indeed from this building, would be consistent with its stated use.

x. **Nuclear Physics Laboratories (B80).** The Iraqi authorities declared that these building had been devoted to plasma physics, ion source physics, magnet development and for future operation of a cyclotron. The building had been heavily damaged during the bombing and had been subjected to an unusually heavy site clearance operation by the Iraqis -- which included even removing the substantial, concrete reinforced floor and -- by the time of the second mission -- regrading the site to a level field. All equipment had been removed from the building before the first mission -- except for two magnets left on the top of the rubble. The building had been serviced by unusually large electrical (7.4 megawatts) and cooling services which appeared to exceed its declared needs.

xi. **Complex Chemistry and Chemical Engineering Research and Development (B85).** The declared purposes of this building were chemical and chemical engineering-related R&D, including a pilot-scale extraction process to recover uranium from ore with a high organic content. The building had been very extensively damaged, first from bombing, then from a vigorous removal operation of the Iraqi authorities. At the time of the first inspection, Iraq had completely removed the two process halls of this building, and by the second inspection very little remained of this complex. The building had an unusually large ventilation system, but the lack of any residual equipment together with the extensive site levelling has made it difficult to determine with certainty the actual uses of this building. Environmental samples were taken and are now being analyzed.

b. Nuclear Materials

i. With respect to the nuclear material declared by Iraq, the Agency inspection teams had to locate, identify, characterize, verify, "freeze" the material so it could only be moved with Agency approval and assess the accessibility for removal of the nuclear-weapons-usable material. The Iraqi declaration of 27 April 1991 had covered all the nuclear material that had been subject to safeguards.[4] The Iraqi authorities had relocated a substantial amount of the nuclear materials to both areas adjacent to and further removed from Tuwaitha.[5]

ii. Extensive verification efforts were carried out during the first inspection on all declared nuclear material. For the nuclear weapons-usable material this involved the following: The presence of all fresh high enriched uranium was confirmed by measurements (17664 g U/12633 g U-235). The presence of irradiated high enriched uranium was confirmed -- [61 items = 16.8 kg U =52% verified by fuel type identified and non-destructive assay (NDA) carried out] [41 items = 8.3 kg U =26% verified by item counting and NDA] [35 items = 7.0 kg U =22% presence indirectly confirmed by radiation dose mapping]. Presence of recovered plutonium [2.26 g] was confirmed.

iii. For non-nuclear weapons-usable material the measurements involved: The presence of low-enriched uranium was confirmed by measurement [irradiated fuel, 10% enrichment = 69 items = 87.8 kg U] [fresh bulk = 2.6% enrichment = 75 items =1762 kg U]. The presence of depleted and natural uranium was confirmed by measurement [3% of inventory =327 kg uranium was reported to be under rubble]. The presence of yellow cake was confirmed by measurements[752 items = 204 tons of natural uranium]. The presence of previously exempted material was confirmed.

iv. The nuclear material outside of the damaged reactor was brought under Agency custody by means of the extensive applications of Agency seals and a regime was established for frequent inspection until this material can be removed from Iraq. Studies were begun for the

[4]Annex IV provides an overview of the nuclear materials and there locations.

[5]Annex V indicates the distribution of this material.

removal from the damaged reactor of the material still there and for applying seals as an interim control measure.

Inspection of Sites Designated by the Special Commission

4. Beginning with the first IAEA inspection, short-notice inspections were carried out of sites designated by the Special Commission. These have included sites at Tarmiya (20 May and 24 June), Abu Ghraib 23, 25, and 26 June), Al Hamath (24 June), Zaafaraniya (26 June), Al Musayyib (27 June) and Falluja (28 June). At two of these site,the Iraqi authorities denied the right of access for the purposes of inspection and removed materials even after the Chief Inspector had ordered that no material or equipment be moved for the sites under the inspections had been completed. Photographic evidence substantiated a strong case that the material which was moved was related to undeclared uranium enrichment activities.

Over-all Development of the Iraqi Nuclear Programme

5. At the end of the second inspection, the team concluded that based on the evidence it had found the Iraqis had been pursuing an undeclared uranium enrichment programme using the electromagnetic isotope separation technique (EMIS).[6]

6. The technologies that must be mastered for a successful EMIS programme include high current ion source development, high voltage DC power supply design and manufacture, high current power supply

[6] EMIS is accomplished by creating a high current beam(10's to 1000's of milliamps) of low energy (10's of KeV) ions and allowing them to pass through a magnetic field (typically 3000-7000 Gauss, or .3-.7 Tesla). The heavier ions bend in a larger radius than the lighter ions and suitable placed collector pockets capture the different isotopes. EMIS is the process originally used by most of the nuclear weapons states to prepare their first highly enriched uranium for nuclear explosives. Its advantages are a well understood design, with much detail available in the open literature, and the ready availability of much of the hardware. The disadvantages of EMIS are the large energy cost per unit of HEU produced and high labor costs associated with operation. This latter disadvantage can now be reduced, however, with the use of readily available computer control software.

design and manufacture, large vacuum system design and operation, collector design and fabrication, and insulator design and fabrication.In addition specific chemical process technologies are required for operation of a uranium EMIS facility: acid washers to clean the vacuum chambers, combustors to burn the graphite collectors, dissolvers to dissolve the ash, solvent extraction systems to purify the uranium solutions, and chemical reactors to prepare uranium tetrachloride feed material. Mechanical engineering capabilities are required for fabrication of massive steel magnet pole pieces, support fixtures, and equipment transport. By the end of the second inspection the following dedicated facilities for each of these required technologies had been located and inspected by the first two IAEA inspection teams. These facilities included:

i. **Buildings Within the Berm at Tuwaitha.** When the first IAEA team visited Tuwaitha it was noted that building 80 had installed power of 7.4 megawatts. This is an inordinately large amount of power for a building of its size and declared function. Building 85 was declared to be a chemical engineering building and therefore should have had equipment in it that would have allowed lab/pilot scale EMIS process chemistry to be demonstrated. These buildings were heavily damaged during the war, as were many other buildings at Tuwaitha. However, these two buildings were singled out for unusually thorough demolition after the first team's visit. The sites where these buildings stood have been graded and cleared to an inexplicable extent. This action, in combination with the extraneous rubble which the first team noted covered the site, suggests an attempt to render difficult the identification of the activities and purposes of these buildings. Environmental samples were taken from nearby objects during this inspection.

ii. **The Al Hamath Workshop.** A significant new site was inspected outside the berm just south of the water purification complex in the northwest portion of the Tuwaitha facility. This site was called Al Hamath by the Iraqis. Our Iraqi military representative stated that the site was used for truck maintenance. This declaration was later amended when the Iraqis said that the facility was a machine shop. Neither declared usage of these buildings is credible. The site had two high bay buildings sharing over 1 megawatt of electrical service and a suitably sized water purification and chiller system. Neither building had been damaged during the war, yet both buildings had been stripped of their contents and the concrete floors had sections removed. If the

facilities had been used for either of the declared purposes there would be no need for either this much power or this much cooling capacity, and there certainly would be no need to gut the buildings. These high bay buildings each had multiple utility drops consisting of high capacity, 380 volt, three phase receptacles, and 220 volt single phase receptacles cooling water facilities spaced along the walls. Each building had large traveling cranes of the same type installed at Tarmiyah, one of which was labeled, "Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission". One of the two cranes was very strongly magnetized. It is the consensus of the team that this site was used as a magnet test facility. Because there was not a nearby suitable chemical processing facility, and because the installed power is relatively low, it is surmised that this facility did not do actual uranium isotope separation (though environmental samples were taken at this site). It is surmised that buildings 80 and 85 did do lab/pilot scale uranium isotope separation with approximately five units for some unknown period of time. The Al Hamath buildings are believed to have been used for magnet tests (possibly including coil winding) and for engineering integration tests of separator systems.

iii. **Tarmiyah.** The Tarmiyah site[7] when inspected by the first team was noted as being unusual because of the mix of buildings with unusually large installed electrical power co-allocated with buildings with large chemical processing capabilities. When the second team reinvestigated the facilities it was clear that the site was a multi-billion dollar EMIS facility. Building 33 was stated by the Iraqis to be used for transformer fabrication. In the technical view of the inspection team this is simply not credible. A transformer plant required metal forming, coil winding, and other capabilities that were clearly absent from this building. The building had two ten ton bridge cranes and two twenty-five ton bridge cranes, an enormous installed electrical supply (over 100 megawatts), and a supply of purified and chilled water. These features are consistent with building 33 housing EMIS machines. The interior of the building was configured as a large bay with two large (5m by 60m) parallel piers for electromechanical equipment with utility outlets and space suitable for approximately 100 EMIS units. The EMIS units would sit approximately three meters above the floor of the central bay, with the power supplies in the adjacent bay and the vacuum pumps on the floor. It is surmised that this building was the site for the first stage of enrichment. The consensus of the team is that this building was never operational, with initial operation six to eighteen months away.

[7] Tarmiyah Site Map in Annex VI

/...

Building 245 is in important ways a smaller version of building 33. The building has approximately 40 megawatts of power, uninterruptable power systems, for control computer power and a large unfinished control room.

It is hypothesized to be the building for the second stage of enrichment. The building could have held 20 EMIS units. The facility utilities were incomplete and it is believed that this facility was twelve to eighteen months from operation.

Building 46 was a process chemistry building that was suitable for high quality batch chemistry work. The building had little process equipment installed and was probably six to twelve months from first operation. This building may have been designed for uranium tetrachloride processing.

Building 57 was stated as being for parts cleaning. The washing facilities in the building were designed for washing heavy objects of the size postulated for the EMIS vacuum chamber. A rail system two meters above the floor was installed for conveniently loading a heavy object into the pressure washers. This building was incomplete with first operation estimated to be in six to twelve months. The team emphasizes that this building was built to conveniently wash parts of a particular configuration and it is the team's opinion that these parts were to be vacuum boxes used in EMIS separators.

Building 225 was stated by the Iraqis to be a heavy metal recovery facility. This is assessed to be a true statement. The building appears to be designed for recovering uranium for recycle into the process. The air handling and filtration equipment in this building was enormous. It is surmised that the extensive filtration was both to conserve valuable enriched material and to prevent isotopic signatures from escaping the plant.

The configuration of buildings 33 and 245 with their unusual electrical and cooling utilities led the team to conclude that Tarmiyah was an EMIS site. The co-located buildings containing all of the necessary ancillary functions completes the case. The only purpose of a multi-billion dollar facility of this type apparent to the team is EMIS of uranium. It is the opinion of the team that Tarmiyah was never operational. Initial startup of the facilities was six to eighteen months away. It has effectively been rendered non-operational and may be adequately monitored by periodic inspections.

iv. **Zaafarniyah.** The IAEA had reason to believe that the Al Dijla and Al-Rabee sites located in Zaafarniyah were used to fabricate EMIS components. Al Dijla is a Ministry of Industry site with electrical engineering design and fabrication facilities. The manufacturing plants inspected were observed to have the following capabilities: coil winding, chassis assembly, computer aided design, printed circuit board fabrication, and control system design and assembly. Some of the equipment at Tarmiya appeared to originate from this site. It is the team's belief that the required electrical components for an EMIS program could be designed and fabricated at Al Dijla but that this facility is not dedicated to EMIS work.

The Al-Rabeeh metal working shops were excellently equipped for precision work as well as very large metal piece work on steel, stainless steel, and aluminium. There was no evidence that facilities for working with pyrophoric (e.g. uranium) or toxic (e.g. beryllium) are present. Al-Rabeeh clearly has the capacity to fabricate the major EMIS metal components but was not being used for EMIS fabrication at the time of the inspection.

v. **Possible EMIS Components and Equipment.** As detailed elsewhere in the full inspection report many storage facilities and trucks were inspected by the team. A substantial amount of dual-use equipment suitable for use in EMIS power supplies was noted. None of this equipment is conclusive by itself, but taken as a whole, enough equipment was documented to state that there seemed to be an unusual amount of electrical equipment that would be appropriate for an EMIS program. Equipment that appeared to be real EMIS equipment (coils, magnet pole pieces, and vacuum chambers) was seen and photographed by several team members as the Iraqis attempted to move it from Fallujah.

Conclusions

There is Iraqi declared evidence of the research and development required for EMIS work (ion source, magnet development, and insulator research at Tuwaitha). There is documented evidence of the ability to manufacture all required components for an EMIS separator. There is evidence that lab or pilot scale EMIS development was done at Tuwaitha. There is further evidence that this research was successful and that a large EMIS process plant was under construction at Tarmiyah. Conclusive evidence that uranium isotope separation was accomplished must await the results from the environmental samples. Uranium unusually depleted in U-235 would be prima facie evidence that EMIS

(large scale laser isotope separation is not credible for Iraq) has been done in Iraq. Accurate assessments of actual production are impossible at this point. It is the opinion of this team that Tarmiyah has never operated and that Tuwaitha had facilities to operate at most five to ten separators. If each separator can produce 1 gram of highly enriched uranium per day (as estimated in a technical note prepared by the second inspection team) then the maximum amount of HEU produced can be estimated if the initial commissioning dates and operating time can be determined. Our best estimate is that Tuwaitha could have had five machines operating for no more than two years and could not have produced more than three kilograms of highly enriched uranium.

Annex I

The Tuwaitha site map



TUWAITHA N.R.C.

33-12 N 044-30 E

/...

ACTION TEAM CONFIDENTIAL

UNSC 687 ACTION TEAM
FIRST ON-SITE INSPECTION

Annex II

List of buildings at Al-Tuwaitha

Bldg. No.	Iraqi Declaration 1991-05-15	Inspector's specification (if different)
1	Personal Control Office	
2	Restaurant	
3	Administrative Building	
4	Biology and Agricultural Labs	
5	Head Administration	
6	Administration	
7	Administration	Training Office
8	Training Offices	External Relations Department
9 *	Chemical Analyses Labs and Radiochemical Labs	
10 *	Chemical Analyses Labs	
11	Telephone Communication	
12	Engineering Services Workshop	Engineering & Neutron Generator
13 *	Research Reactor IRT-5000	
14	Sub-Station	
15 *	Isotope Production Laboratory	
16 *	Mechanical Production Workshop	Workshop for IRT
17 *	Mechanical Production Workshop	
18	Medical Analyses Lab	
19	Offices and Stores	Open Air Pool
20	Offices and Stores	
21	Offices and Stores	
22	Hot Laboratories LAMA	
23	Laboratory Workship Building	
24	Tamuz-2 Zero Power Reactor	
25	Store	
26	Chemical Cleaning Workshop	
27	Caravan	
28	Caravans	
29	Chemical Cleaning Workshop	Caravan

/...

Bldg. No.	Iraqi Declaration 92-05-15	Inspector's specification (if different)
30	Chemical Cleaning Workshop	
31	Cooling Tower	Cooling Tower for Tamuz
32	Cooling Tower	Warehouse
33	Offices	
34	Offices and Stores	
35 *	Radioactive Waste Treatment Station (RWTS)	
36	Store	Solid Waste Store
37	Training Offices	Storage
38	Training Offices Labs	
39	Store	Permanent Solid Waste Storage
40	Solid Waste Storage	Waste Storage for IRT
41	Control Room for No. 40	Nuclear Instrument Calibration and Waste Storage
42	Technical Library and Conference Rooms	
43 *	Technical Library and Conference Rooms	
44	Technical Library and Conference Rooms	
45	Water Treatment Station	
46	Biology and Agricultural Labs	
47	Biology and Agricultural Labs	
48	Biology and Agricultural Labs	
49	Biology and Agricultural Labs	
50	Mechanical Workshops and Stores	(includes also IQZ-)
51	Mechanical Workshops and Stores	
52	Mechanical Workshops and Stores	
53	Mechanical Workshops and Stores	
54	Mechanical Workshops and Stores	Graphite Workshop
55	Mechanical Workshops and Stores	
56	Mechanical Workshops and Stores	
57	Mechanical Workshops and Stores	
58	Cafeteria	
59 *	Health Physics Building	
60	Offices	

Bldg No.		Iraqi Declaration 1991-05-15	Inspectors specification (if different)
61		Incinerator	
62		Sewage Station	
63	*	Cold Material Testing Laboratories	
64		Chemical Waste Treatment (liquids)	Rad Waste Process Building
65	*	Chemical Waste Treatment (liquids)	
66		Chemical Waste Treatment (liquids)	Offices/Training Building
67		Deionized Water Production Units	
68		Utilities	Storage
69		Utilities	Oil Storage
70		Utilities	Electrolytical/Production of Hydrogen
71		Utilities	
72		Utilities	
73		Workshops	Workshop for Fuel Fabrication Laboratory and Hall for Material Testing
74		Power Sub-Station	
75		Caravans	
76		Power Sub-Station	Canteen
77		Utilities Workshop	
78		Utilities Workshop	
79		Caravans	
80	*	Nuclear Physics Laboratories	
81		Cafeteria	
82	*	Electronic Research Laboratories	Electronics Department & Computer Center
83		Utilities	
84		Utilities	Chemistry & Chemical Engineering R&D
85	*	Chemical Research Laboratories	
86	*	Mechanical Design Laboratories	
87		Medical Centre	
88		Health Center	
89		Caravans	
90		Polymer Chemistry Laboratory	

bldgrev/lb/91 06-04

Annex III

Summary of follow-up actions

	Building	Status of Building	Recommended further Action
1	B24 TAMUZ 1,2	heavily damaged	Future monitoring of recovered equipment from Tamux 1 (e.g., heat exchangers and pumps) required
2	B24 Hot Cells	badly damaged (but concrete structure intact)	Monitoring until positive confirmation of status
3	B23 Laboratories and workshop	totally damaged	Future monitoring of recovered equipment (e.g., lasers and optics work) required
4	B22 "LAMA"	damaged	- Monitoring of the status of hot cells - Future monitoring of recovered equipment (e.g., some parts of 2 hot cells - one concrete and one lead) required
5	B35 Radioactive waste treatment	partially damaged but 2 hot cells in good condition	Future monitoring of hot cells
6	B13 IRT-5000	heavily damaged	Removal of 80% and 36% enriched fuel
7	B13 Hot Cells	concrete structure undamaged	- clearance of debris - monitoring until positive confirmation of status and removal of fuel from IRT-5000
8	B9 Radiochemistry Laboratories	equipment within B9 largely escaped damage	Future monitoring

	Building	Status of Building	Recommended further Action
9	B15 Radioisotopes Production Laboratory	damaged but 2 hot cells structure intact	Future monitoring if the building is restored
10	B73 The "Italian" area	heavily bombed	- Future monitoring of the material testing laboratory - Future monitoring of recovered equipment (e.g., equipment relevant to reprocessing) required
11	B64, 56, 66, 67	buildings damaged	Future monitoring
12	B63, B80, B85 (new R&D area)	heavily damaged	Future monitoring of recovered equipment (e.g., related to material testing, plasma physics and uranium extraction) required
13	B45 to B58 Workshop area	many buildings, one still usable	- Future monitoring - Future monitoring of recovered equipment (e.g., graphite machine shop tools) required
14	Remaining areas	many buildings are still usable	- Monitoring of any future reuse of buildings - Check of removed equipment

(0185B)

Annex IV

UNSC687

Summary-description of locations

NO.	LOCATION	STATUS
1	IQA- IRT Research Reactor	1. Facility destroyed; however no H_2O leackage for core pool and spent fuel detected yet. 2. Nuclear Material: (a) Apparently no damage of fuel since contamination of pool water not above normal level. (b) In both pools significant amounts of soil and rubble were discovered. (c) It was not possible to confirm the presence of all fuel items. (d) Fresh fuel removed, verified at new site.
2	IQB- Tamuz 2 Research Reactor (empty = no nuclear material present)	1. Facility destroyed. 2. Nuclear material: all material (fresh and spent fuel) was removed from the facility. (Fresh fuel to Site A, spent fuel to Site B).
3	IQC- Fuel Fabrication Laboratory	1. Facility destroyed, area contamination. 2. Nuclear Material: - Fuel assemblies damaged, under rubble - 53 out of 55 fuel rods recovered. - 74% of bulk material recovered, rest suspected under rubble.
4	IQZ- Storage Facility (empty = no nuclear material present)	1. Facility destroyed. 2. Nuclear material: all nuclear material removed to a new storage.
5	New Storage Facility	Nuclear Material: (a) Previously "exempted" material (b) IQZ- material = DU, NU, LEU (2.6%) (c) rods, pellets recovered from IQC-.
6	Location A	Nuclear Material: (a) Fresh fuel, HEU; from IQA- (b) Fresh fuel, HEU; from IQB-
7	Location B	Nuclear Material: Spent fuel from IQB-
8	Location C	Nuclear Material: (a) Yellow Cake in drums (b) Bulk material recovered from IQC.

ACTION TEAM CONFIDENTIAL

/...

June 13, 1991

Annex V

Location, types and quantities of nuclear fuel assemblies

I. Fresh Fuel Assemblies at Location A Adjacent to Nuclear Site

- 68 items of IRT-5000, tubular type, total U-235 content 10.973 g (enrichment: 80%) 1/
- 10 items EK-36 type (rod cluster) total U-235 content 1,272 g (enrichment: 36%)
- 1 item Osirak type (French MTR) total U-235 content 388 g (enrichment: 93%)

II. Spent Fuel Assemblies Stored at Location B Near Nuclear Site

- 38 items Osirak type (French MTR) total U-235 content 11,050 g (enrichment: 93%)
- 20 items IRT-5000 tubular type initial U-235 content 3,165 g (enrichment: 80%) 2/
- 3 items EK-36 type (rod cluster) initial U-235 content 360 g (enrichment: 36%) 3/
- 69 items EK-10 type (rod cluster) initial U-235 content 8,776 g (enrichment: 10%) 4/

III. Spent Fuel Assemblies Remaining in the IRT 5000 Core, Pool and Storage Bay 5/

- 22 items in core, IRT-5000 tubular type, total U-235 content 3,510 g (enrichment: 80%)
- 42 items in adjacent storage bay, IRT-5000 tubular type, total U-235 content 6,632 g (enrichment: 80%)
- 12 items in core pool storage rack, IRT-5000 tubular type, total U-235 content 1,890 g. (enrichment: 80%)

1/ Detailed drawings available. Two items damaged but nuclear material not affected.

2/ Estimated burn-up is 40%.

3/ Burn-up unknown, but probably very low.

4/ Removal of these items still to be decided.

5/ Detailed drawing of fuel assembly available. Estimated average burn-up of 42 items and the 12 items is 40%; burn-up of remaining 22 items in core unknown.

/...

Annex VI

Tarmiya
Possible Nuclear Facility
33-36N 044-23E



UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22789
15 July 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 12 JULY 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that the United States Air Force continues to violate Iraqi airspace. Details of the violations on 10/11 July 1991 are set out below.

1. Thirty-seven sorties were flown by 18 two-aircraft formations and one single aircraft. The enemy aircraft were flying at speeds of 600 to 700 kilometres per hour, at low and medium altitudes.

2. The sorties centred over Mosul, Dahuk and Arbil, for the purpose of observation and provocation.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

91-22839 2552j (E)

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22790
15 July 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 JULY 1991 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government and further to our previous letters concerning the latest Iraqi violations of the terms of cease-fire, I have the honour to report 16 cases of such violations by Iraqi military from 10 May to 5 June 1991.

1. At 1840 hours, on 10 May 1991, three vehicles carrying 50 Iraqis were stationed at the geographical coordinates of NC 404-141 on the map of Khosravi.

2. At 1710 hours, on 10 May 1991, Iraqi forces constructed an observation post at the geographical coordinates of NC 847-187 on the map of Halaleh.

3. On 11 May 1991, Iraq doubled the number of its troops in the geographical coordinates of NC 465-155 and NC 468-156 on the map of Kharatha.

4. On 11 May 1991, several artillery shells were fired towards the Islamic Republic of Iran which hit across from the Soobleh border station in the Bostan area.

5. At 1130 hours, on 11 May 1991, Iraqi forces set up several group tents at the geographical coordinates of NC 405-144 on the map of Khosravi.

6. At 0830 hours, on 11 May 1991, Iraqi forces deployed 17 tanks at the zero point on the border in the general area of Fakkeh.

7. On 12 May 1991, Iraqi forces constructed several bunkers and set up five tents at the geographical coordinates of 945-983 on the map of Kooh Gootbeh.

8. On 12 May 1991, Iraqi forces strengthened their position and deployed three 60-millimetre rocket launchers at the geographical coordinates of 421-655 and 422-650 on the map of Naft Shahr.

9. On 14 May 1991, an Iraqi infantry battalion was deployed to the area between Sharhani and Bajlieh at the geographical coordinates of 312-806 and 335-778 on the map of Nahr-e-Anbar.

10. From 0930 to 1250 hours, on 14 May 1991, 35 Iraqi soldiers were observed constructing a bunker at the geographical coordinates of 403-128, 407-045 and 427-047 on the map of Khosravi.

11. At 0500 hours on 15 May 1991, Iraqi forces, comprised of infantry and armoured personnel, moved forward along the border with the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Majnoon Island area and stationed at the zero point on the border.

12. At 2030 hours on 26 May 1991, two Iraqi soldiers were observed patrolling in an area close to 2 kilometres inside the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the geographical coordinates of 708-248 on the map of Halaleh.

13. On 28 May 1991, six Iraqi soldiers were observed constructing a bunker 400 metres away from the border at the geographical coordinates of 513-827 on the map of Sizdeh.

14. On 28 May 1991, a group of Iraqi forces occupied hill No. 290 inside the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the geographical coordinates of 452-008 on the map of Khosravi.

15. On 31 May 1991, four Iraqi soldiers were observed patrolling in an area 50 metres inside the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the geographical coordinates of 52-49 on the map of Yabil.

16. Between 2 and 5 June 1991, Iraqi forces engaged in strengthening their border posts to the north of Ghasr-e-Shirin along Goureh Tou river and 500 Iraqi military personnel were observed around Bishegan Pass. Border posts across from Sumar, Khani Sheikh, Bazargan and Talkh Ab were reinforced by new troops.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) M. Javad ZARIF
Ambassador
Deputy Permanent Representative

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22791
15 July 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 JULY 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF LEBANON TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that the Lebanese Government has decided to request the Security Council to extend the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which expires on 31 July 1991, for a further period of six months, on the basis of the provisions of Security Council resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 501 (1982), 508 (1982), 509 (1982) and of all other relevant resolutions and decisions of the Security Council.

Since the last renewal of the mandate of UNIFIL, the Lebanese Government has extended its authority beyond the greater Beirut area towards the north, east and south, thus ushering in a new dawn of peace for most of the nation. In accordance with the timetable of the Taif agreement, militias previously operating in these areas have successfully been disbanded and their weapons turned in to the Lebanese Army, thus ensuring the return of stability and security. One exception to Lebanon's success remains however, and that is in the most southern region of the country, where Israel imposes its reign of terror over the civilian population. This occupation has been allowed to continue for 13 years now, in blatant violation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) and subsequent resolutions and decisions of the United Nations.

The Lebanese Government is sparing no effort to extend its sovereignty over southern Lebanon, in fulfilment of Security Council resolution 425 (1978). In the last two weeks, the Lebanese Army has also been successfully deployed in the Sidon and Tyre regions adjacent to the city of Jezzine and the UNIFIL area of operation, where it is actively collecting armaments from all Lebanese and non-Lebanese groups. It is the intention of the Lebanese Government to progressively assume responsibility for security in UNIFIL's present area of deployment, a process which will make it possible for UNIFIL to deploy down to the international border.

In the wake of all these positive steps, and at a time when the Lebanese Government has delivered the nation unto a process of normalization, Israel has amplified its refusal to withdraw from southern Lebanon in accordance with

Security Council resolution 425 (1978). It has stepped up its efforts to impede and thwart any attempt to restore peace and stability to Lebanon, and has recently intensified its aggressions by extending its attacks beyond the occupied zone to areas surrounding the major cities of Sidon and Tyre. High Israeli officials such as the Defence Minister and the Defence Ministry's Coordinator for Lebanese Affairs are declaring publicly that they have no intention whatsoever of withdrawing from the so-called "security zone" and the Jezzine area, and will continue to strengthen Israel's proxy militia in the south of Lebanon.

At a time when the United Nations is witnessing growing strength as part of the new world order, and at a time when the Security Council has recently demonstrated its resolve and leverage in implementing international law as embodied in the Charter, it is no longer acceptable that the blatant occupation of southern Lebanon be allowed to stand in violation of the United Nations Charter as well as numerous United Nations Security Council resolutions. Lebanon demands the prompt implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978).

In this context, the presence of UNIFIL continues to remain of utmost necessity to provide much needed assistance and support for the civilian population faced with the violent and arbitrary nature of Israeli occupation. However, this assistance cannot be a substitute for the fulfilment of UNIFIL's original mandate as set forth in Security Council resolution 425 (1978), which is to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli Forces from Lebanon and to assist the Government of Lebanon, through its armed forces, in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.

The Lebanese Government takes this opportunity to pay tribute to the UNIFIL command, troops and administrators, and to the troop-contributing countries for their efforts and sacrifices in serving the cause of peace. It also expresses its deep appreciation for the tireless endeavours of the Secretary-General and his aides, which are instrumental in the valuable presence and work of UNIFIL in southern Lebanon.

(Signed) Dr. Khalil MAKKAWI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative